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A New Legal Approach
by Robert W. Glowinski
In 1809, the State of Maryland
attempted to codify its criminal laws
for the first time. (1809 Md. Laws ch.
138). Prior to this time crimes were
dealt with under the common law.
This act, however, concerned itself
primarily with providing punishments
for certain crimes.
In particular, the statute relating to
arson referenced only the common
law crime and provided for the pun-
ishment of hanging or alternatively 5
to 20 years in the penitentiary. Other
punishments were delineated for the
burning of specified properties and
certain sailing vessels. In 1904 the
legislature changed the use of the
common law definition of arson slight-
ly by expanding the crime to include
one's own dwelling house if the intent
in burning it was to injure or defraud.
The legislature also included a res-
tructuring of the penalties.
The first substantive attempt at
making arson a statutory crime in
Maryland occurred in 1929. The sta-
tute in force today in the State remains
similar. Since that time the only sec-
tions that have been added to the sta-
tute were to address cross burnings,
burning of trash containers, the com-
mission of arson while committing
another crime and a changing of the
penalties. While retaining the com-
mon law definition, what has in fact
changed is the delineation of those
items that if burned intentionally will
constitute arson, and the expansion
of laws dealing with arson related
crimes such as burning to defraud an
insurer, setting a fire during commis-
sion of other crimes and attempted
arson.
Taking a closer look at the arson
laws as they exist today in Maryland
we can compare their requirements
with other arson laws, especially the
model laws and evaluate their ade-
quacy in meeting their purpose.
State Arson Laws
Codification of arson from the
common law has not been uniformly
accomplished among the states. Most
state arson statutes are derived from
two existing model laws: the Model
Arson Law developed by the National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
and revised by the National Board of
Fire Underwriters (NBFU) based upon
common law or the Model Penal
Code of the American Law Institute.
Arson statutes in Maryland are sim-
ilar in principal to the model law of
the NBFU and NFPA. The common
theme among these types of statutes
is the codification of the common law
crime in the primary arson section
which represented the most serious
offense. The second section generally
covers the crime of burning buildings
and other structures not used as
dwellings. These provisions are fol-
lowed by other offenses including the
burning of property not a building
and attempted arson.
Maryland Arson Statutes
Like the model law upon which it is
based, the Maryland Arson Law codi-
fies in the primary statute the com-
mon law crime of arson, the malicious
burning of the dwelling of another.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §6 (1982 rep.
vol.). Similar to its precursor, the sta-
tute does not include a requirement
that the structure be occupied. How-
ever, structures in this section need
not be "of another" and must be
potentially occupiable.
At common law a, "dwelling house"
was not only the mansion house but
"all outhouses which were a parcel
thereof." Smith v. State, 31 Md. App.
106, 355 A.2d 527 (1976). Maryland
has specified in its arson statute a
number of buildings that are to be
considered part of the dwelling by
law, such as kitchens, shops, barns or
stables. While other jurisdictions have
held a dwelling house to include jails
State v. Whitmore, 147 Mo. 78, 47 S.W.
1068 (1898) and schoolhouses, Wallace
v. Young, 21 Ky. 155 (1827), the Courts
in Maryland have not been called
upon to make such distinctions.
The provision in Maryland cover-
ing the illegal burning of buildings
other than dwelling houses can be
found in the second arson statute,
MD. ANN. CODE. art. 27, §7 (1982
rep. vol.). Originally specifying spe-
cific buildings, this statute has evolved
into a "catch-all" statute covering all
buildings not specified in section 6. It
is not necessary that the building be
usable for some useful purpose or
that it be intended for use and occu-
pancy. Brown v. State, 39 Md. App. 497,
388 A.2d 130 (1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 285 Md. 469, 403 A.2d 789
(1979).
Again, like the model law on which
it is based these two sections are fol-
lowed by other "arson" offenses includ-
ing burning of property not a building
and attempted arson. MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, §§8-10 (1982 rep. vol.).
Corpus Delecti
To prove the crime of arson it is
necessary to establish two elements:
that there was a burning and that the
fire was of incendiary origin. The
extent of the burning is not impor-
tant. The slightest burning satisfies
the element. In a particular example
where a molotov cocktail was thrown
through the window of a high school,
burning within the scope of the sta-
tute was found only where paint on
the window and a venetian blind cord
had been burned. Fulford v. State, 8 Md.
App. 270, 259 A.2d 551 (1969). It is of
vital importance, however, that the
fire from the initial burning item
somehow be communicated to the
structure or property itself. Hines v.
State, 34 Md. App. 612, 368 A.2d 509
(1977).
The second element of the corpus
delecti of arson is the showing of an
incendiary origin. By statute in Mary-
land, there is still a requirement for
willful and malicious burning, as was
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the case at common law. The effect of
this requirement is to render insuffi-
cient a showing of either carelessness
or negligence on the part of the
accused. The prosecution must show
there was criminal intent or negli-
gence constituting intent under the
law.
Within the context of arson, the
courts of many jurisdictions have
defined willful and malicious as used
at common law or in respective sta-
tutes. Many states find malice implicit
in all intentional burnings. Maryland
rejected this concept when the Court
of Appeals, reversing the Court of
Special Appeals, held that willful and
malicious were independent of each
other and that malice could not be
inferred simply from the willfulness
of one's actions. Brown v. State, 285 Md.
469, 403 A.2d 789 (1979). The Court
of Appeals stated that malice is defined
as "an intention or desire to harm
another," while willful was something
done intentionally. Malice, which must
be present for an arson conviction, is
the intent to bring harm to another
person and cannot be inferred simply
from the intent to burn. However,
this has now been further narrowed
to permit malice to be inferred from
the setting of a fire with reckless and
wanton disregard of the consequences,
even if the intent or desire to hurt
another is absent. Debettencourt v. State,
48 Md. App. 522,428 A.2d 479 (1981).
Arson Problem in Maryland
Since fires are not reported to the
State Fire Marshal with any regularity,
arson in Maryland is difficult to quan-
tify. It is estimated that between
3,500 and 4,000 arson fires occur
annually in the State. Dollar losses
total $30 million a year. On the aver-
age, 15 people die with uncountable
indirect losses to jobs and families.
The Governor of Maryland recently
appointed an Anti-Arson Advisory
Council to determine strategy for
statewide prevention, detection and
control of arson in Maryland. (9:5 Md.
R. 441-442 (March 5, 1982).
On a national scale the problem is
even more epidemic, with over 700
people killed in arson fires and $1.3
billion lost, through destruction of
buildings. Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency, U.S. Fire Adminis-
tration, "Arson - The Federal Role in
Arson Prevention and Control," report
to Congress, August, 1979, p. v-vii.
Add to this the tax revenues lost and
the dollar losses are multiplied many
times. The National Fire Protection
Association reported that the number
of incendiary and suspicious fires in
the United States increased from 5,600
in 1951 to 177,000 in 1978. Carter,
"Arson and Arson Investigation in
the United States," 74 Fire J. 40 (July
1980). These statistics are a clear indi-
cation of the direction the problem is
taking both in Maryland and the U.S.
The National Commission on Fire
Prevention and Control charged that
the NBFU model law (like the Mary-
land statute) has not been changed to
meet the modern challenges of "urban
violence." As a result, efforts at devel-
oping new laws to address what is
perceived as a "modern arson prob-
lem" have been undertaken.
Model Arson Penal Law
A new "model" law has been pro-
posed by the insurance industry to be
referred to as the Model Arson Penal
Law (MAPL). Included in this new
law are provisions for criminal mis-
chief, possession of explosives, at-
tempted arson and others. The first
section (100.1) of MAPL is for Arson
and Related Offenses. Within this
section are substantive subsections
classified into aggravated arson, arson,
reckless burning or exploding, and
failure to control or report a danger-




In Maryland, the most severe pen-
alties are provided for arson to a dwell-
ing house, while arson of other build-
ings is a lesser felony. The MAPL, on
the other hand, removes the require-
ment that the building be a dwelling
and substitutes the requirement for
either occupancy or causing a death
either directly or indirectly.
The underlying premise of the Mary-
land statute is to protect property.
The Court of Appeals noted in Wimp-
ling v. State, 171 Md. 362, 189 A. 248,
#253 (1937), that since the Maryland
arson statutes are directed against
the burning of buildings, regardless
of occupancy, the offense is against
property. MAPL, however, shifts the
emphasis of the law to the protection
of human life. The purposes of the
two laws differ. The question, then, is
one of priority. Do we wish to deter
the intentional burning of buildings,
or diminish the threat which arson
imposes upon human life? The ideal
goal is to achieve both while distin-
guishing the more severe act, whether
intended or not, of taking a human
life in the commission of arson. Sec-
tion 100.1 (1)(a) of MAPL would find
FORUM
a person guilty of Aggravated Arson
for starting a fire with the purpose of
destroying or damaging any inhabited
building or structure of another. Sec-
tion 100.1 (i)(b) includes as Aggra-
vated Arson any fire started for the
purpose of causing either death or
bodily injury to any other person,
either directly or indirectly. It appears
that this second subsection has been
included to protect others, possibly
not in buildings, who should happen
to be killed or injured as a result of the
act.
Arson within MAPL includes the
intentional burning of unoccupied struc-
tures of another or destroying one's
own property to collect insurance.
Maryland, through legislation, has
removed the ownership requirement
from its law. It is thus the same felony
in Maryland to set your own building
on fire as it is to set another's. MAPL
equates the burning of an unoccupied
structure of another with the burn-
ing of one's own property when the
intent is to defraud an insurer.
The MAPL also includes a section
on reckless burning. This section would
include any fire intentionally started
that places another person in danger
or places the building of another in
danger of damage or destruction. Re-
cent Maryland court interpretation
would allow a conviction for reckless
burning under the arson statutes.
However, the term reckless appeared
to connote a much more negligent
action than is required under MAPL.
Another section of the MAPL, not
present in Maryland law, covers fail-
ure to control or report a dangerous
fire. This section makes it a misde-
meanor to fail to combat or control a
fire if under a duty and if it can be
done without substantial risk to one's
self, or alternatively for failing to give
a prompt alarm.
A last section, apart from the main
arson provisions of §100.1, covers
attempted arson. Section 100.5 covers
placement of any material or device
with the intent to eventually start a
fire or explosion, with the purpose of
willfully and maliciously (a) destroy-
ing a structure of another; or (b) des-
troying valued property; or (c) placing
any person in danger of bodily harm.
Proposal
In its review of barriers to revising
state arson laws, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce criticized MAPL
for being incompatible with the laws
of those states not using the Model
Penal Code. In response to this criti-
cism and other faults of MAPL, a new
model is suggested as an appropriate
law for adoption by those states such
as Maryland not presently using the
Model Penal Code. This proposal
draws from the present Maryland
arson laws, the MAPL and the Pro-
posed Criminal Code of the Maryland
Commission on Criminal Law (sec-
tion 150.10, 1972).
Sec. 1- First Degree Arson - Any
person who willfully and mali-
ciously sets fire to or causes,
aids, counsels or procures the
burning of any occupied build-
ing, shall be guilty of First
Degree Arson.
Sec. 2- Second Degree Arson - (A)
Any person who willfully and
maliciously sets fire to or causes,
aids, counsels or procures the
burning of any unoccupied
building of another, or (B)
Any person who willfully sets
fire to or causes, aids, coun-
sels, or procures the burning
of any real or personal prop-
erty to collect insurance, shall
be guilty of Second Degree
Arson.
Sec. 3- Reckless Burning - Any per-
son who purposely causes an
explosion or fire, or if he aids,
counsels or procures a fire or
explosion, whether on his own
property or that of another
and thereby recklessly:
(A) Places another person in
danger of death or bodily
injury; or
(B) Places a building or struc-
ture of another in danger
of damage or destruction,
whether or not occupied;
or
(C) Places any personal prop-
erty of another, having a
value of $25 or more, in
danger of damage and de-
struction, shall be guilty
of Reckless Burning.
Sec. 4- Failure to Report a Fire -
Any person who knows that a
fire is endangering life or prop-
erty of another and fails to
give a prompt fire alarm, shall
be guilty of Failing to Report a
Fire. It is an affirmative defense
that:
(A) The defendant reasonably
believed that the giving of
a prompt fire alarm was
impossible, futile, or in-
volved a substantial risk
of injury; or
(B) The defendant reasonably
believed that a fire alarm
had already been given or
was being promptly given
by another person; or
(C) Failure to give the alarm
was due to the defendant
being engaged in reason-
able measures to suppress
or control the fire, or res-
cue persons endangered
by the fire. No person
shall be tried and convicted
of this offense and any
arson offense resulting
from the same fire.
Sec. 5- Attempted Arson - Any per-
son who willfully and mali-
ciously attempts to set fire to,
or attempts to burn or to aid,
counsel or procure the burn-
ing of:
(A) Any structure or building
mentioned in section I of
this law, or commits any
act preliminary thereto,
or in furtherance thereof,
is guilty of Attempted
Arson in the First Degree.
(B) Any structure or building
mentioned in section 2 of
this law, or commits any
act preliminary thereto,
or in furtherance thereof,
is guilty of Attempted
Arson in the Second De-
gree.
Proposed Penalties
First Degree Arson - Not more
than 30 years
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Second Degree Arson - Not more
than 20 years
Reckless Burning - Not more than
I year and/or $1,000 fine
Failure to Report - Not more than
I year and/or $500 fine
Attempted Arson (first degree) -
Not more than 10 years
Attempted Arson (second degree)
- Not more than 2 years and/or
$1,000 fine
Comment
First Degree Arson - Applies to
occupancy of the building, whether
or not known, when the fire endangers
any person other than the person
being charged. This section represents
a departure from MAPL. First, it does
not require the purpose of the fire to
be to destroy or damage the building.
This requirement of purpose would
necessitate a specific intent not neces-
sarily present when a fire is set.
Second, MAPL alternatively requires
a purpose of causing death or injury
to another person. But what if death
results to a fireman responding to the
fire? Could the intent to harm a fire-
man be inferred from the setting of
the fire? The Maryland Court of
Appeals has stated that fighting fires,
however caused, is a fireman's occu-
pation. Apart from intentionally caus-
ing injury, failing to warn of hidden
dangers, and statutory violations,
there is no liability to firemen. Brown,
403 A.2d at 792; 285 Md at 476. Ara-
vanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 206
A.2d 148 (1965).
Since it is foreseeable that injury to
a fireman may result anytime the fire
department is called, it should not be
determinative of the crime charged.
However, where an affirmative act is
made that may directly result in death
or injury to fireman, appropriate
counts should also be brought charg-
ing assault, battery or homicide. Fires
begun other than inside the occupied
building would result in First Degree
Arson as well, when it can be shown
that the intent was to have the fire
spread to the occupied structure.
Causing explosions is covered in
MAPL and is adequately addressed in
MD. ANN.CODE art. 27, §§111 and
139A (1982 rep. vol.) on malicious
destruction of property and posses-
sion and use of molotov cocktails and
other explosive devices.
Second Degree Arson - Again, no
purpose is required for the burning to
be included in this section. As the
State of Maryland Commission on
Criminal Law found, it should be an
affirmative defense under this sec-
tion that: (a) no other person had a
possessory or proprietary interest in
the building, or that such person con-
sented to the act; and (b) the sole
intent was to destroy the building for
a lawful purpose with no intent to
collect the insurance; and (c) there was
no reasonable ground to believe that
damage to another structure may
occur or that danger to another per-
son may be created. This section also
includes fires begun outside the un-
occupied structure where it is intended
that the fire spread to the unoccupied
structure. Intentional destruction of
wholly personal property is covered
in MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §I 11 (1982
rep. vol.).
The most significant inclusion under
Second Degree Arson is arson-for-
profit: that is an intent to defraud an
insurer. A substantial percentage of
all arson fires occur because of eco-
nomic factors, such as intentional
overinsurance, need to reduce inven-
tories double insurance. Present Mary-
land law penalizes arson-for-profit
with only a 5 year jail sentence, and
further provides punishment only for
arson-for-profit of personal property.
Reckless Burning - This section
adopts the proposal in MAPL. It in-
cludes the reckless use of explosives
not contemplated under MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, §§111 and 139A (1982
rep. vol.). It is an attempt to codify the
decision of the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals in Debettencourt v. State,
48 Md. App. 522,428 A.2d 479 (1981),
where the Maryland Court of Appeals
held that the intentional setting of a
fire in wanton and reckless disregard
of the consequences to the safety of
others is a sufficient element and con-
stitutes malice.
Failure to Report a Fire - This
section would require those under a
duty to report a fire to do so, although
excuses for failure to do so may be
affirmative defenses. The duty may
arise officially, contractually or as a
result of negligence or recklessness in
causing the fire. One of the criticisms
of the parallel section in MAPL was
that the section, as proposed, would
possibly penalize for first attempting
to control the fire and then calling the
fire department when the fire got out
of control. Here, the section would
not require control of the fire, but
only to take measures to report the
fire when there is knowledge of the
fire and the ensuing danger.
Attempted Arson - This section
adopts the format and theory of the
present Maryland statute on attemp-
ted arson. This allows the punish-
ment to be linked to the severity of
the offense had it been completed,
which is not present in MAPL. Chang-
ing the wording is necessary for com-
patability with other sections of the
proposal. A section on attempted arson
is very necessary to give force to the
other arson sections. If the risk of
punishment did not apply to those
who attempt arson, it would create a
confidence that the only risk taken
would be where the crime has been
successful. When attempted, a crime
should be considered to have been
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The wording of the statute, how-
ever, does not specify at what point
an act comes near enough to the
accomplishment of arson to be punish-
able as an attempt. If the preparation
comes very near to the accomplish-
ment of the act, the intent to com-
plete it renders the crime so probable
that the act will be a crime. It is all a
question of degree which will vary
with the circumstances. Every act
short of actual commission need not
be accomplished to convict of attemp-
ted arson. The only requirement for
conviction is an act "tending to effect
the commission of a crime." Cody v.
State, 605 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Cr. App.
1980).
Adequacy of the Various Laws
To evaluate the adequacy of the
various laws discussed here a number
of hypothetical situations are exam-
ined in terms of the expected out-
come under the particular law, within
the bounds of the facts given.
Example 1 - Recklessly burning
one's own unoccupied dwelling house.
No insurance claims filed.
Maryland - Probable conviction
under art. 27, §6.
MAPL - Possible conviction for
reckless burning.
Proposal - Possible conviction
for reckless burning.
Comment - Similar to Debetten-
court, present Maryland law places
emphasis on property burned. While
it is necessary to deter arson because
of the damage it causes, proper em-
phasis is better placed on the danger it
causes. Although lacking specific mali-
cious intent, if the fire recklessly
endangers other people or property it
becomes an act that society ought to
punish. However, punishment should
fit the seriousness of the crime com-
mitted. Present Maryland arson law
equates this fact situation with one
where a fire is set to kill an entire
family.
Example 2 - Attempted Arson of a
structure
Maryland - Conviction under
art. 27, §10 (a,b).
MAPL - Conviction under § 100.5.
Proposal - Conviction under §5
(A,B).
Comment - MAPL does not dis-
tinguish between attempted arson of
an occupied dwelling house or an
unoccupied barn. Linking the pun-
ishment to the offense would provide
greater equity.
Example 3 - Burning of .own,
occupied dwelling house which is be-
lieved to be unoccupied. No insurance
claims are filed, however, all occu-
pants were killed.
Maryland - Conviction under
Art. 27, sec. 6.
MAPL - At best a conviction for
Reckless Burning.
Proposal - Conviction for First
Degree Arson.
Comment - Under MAPL to be
either Aggravated Arson or Arson
would require that either the struc-
ture be owned by another, or that
death or bodily injury be intended or
the intent of the fire be to collect
insurance. Starting a fire in an occu-
pied dwelling is a serious offense
whether or not it is owned by the
firesetter. It should not be dependent
upon an intent to injure for a penalty
to ensue.
Example 4 - Burning of un-
occupied, empty warehouse to defraud
the insurer.
Maryland - Implicitly covered
under §7; probably no conviction under
arson to defraud, §9; possible convic-
tion under the gradu statutes: Art. 48
A §233.
MAPL - Conviction under§100.1
(2)(b), for arson to defraud an insurer.
Proposal - Conviction under §2
for arson to defraud an insurer.
Comment - Present Maryland law
expressly relating to arson fraud ap-
plies only to personal property. While
arson fraud of real property is implic-
itly covered under §§6 and 7, the mal-
ice element of these sections, as dis-
cussed in Brown, presents a more
difficult burden than an intent to
defraud element.
These examples point out just a
few of the differences in these three
arson laws. While there will always be
a certain set of circumstances that
none of the three laws addresses spe-
cifically, the general intent behind
each of the three statutes is evident to
the Courts that would have to inter-
pret them.
Conclusion
Arson laws are criticized in this
country as lacking uniformity, appro-
priate penalties, and specific delinea-
tion of responsibilities. The Arson
Resource Exchange Bulletin, a publi-
cation of the U.S. Fire Administra-
tion, reported that
Arson is no longer a crime against
property but a crime against each
and every citizen, and a brazen
attack on the entire economy of
our country .... Many lawmakers
do not agree with the far-reaching
potential of this crime, because they
are still hung up on it being a vic-
timless crime - a crime against
property.
There has been an attempt to ana-
lyze the Maryland arson laws to deter-
mine their impact on the crime within
the state. State laws in general have
been specifically cited as suffering
from verbose and vague language,
poor treatment of related offenses,
and lack of proper punishments to fit
the offense. In response, a Model
Arson Penal Law (MAPL) was devel-
oped in an attempt to overcome these
deficiencies, common to many states.
However, in analyzing that proposed
law a few shortcomings were recog-
nized as well. As a result, a new pro-
posal is made, that could be adopted
by many states including Maryland,
that attempts to shift the emphasis
on arson from being a crime solely
against property, to a crime against
people as well.
This proposal is intended only as a
starting point, something legislators
can build on and improve. The suc-
cess of such a law, a departure from
common law arson, will depend upon
its ability to incorporate the tradi-
tional elements of the common law
with a statutory formulation that
attempts to address a growing, mod-
ern problem not contemplated by the
original legislative authors.
